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Introduction: How to re-design a village
Liuxian Village is fairly typical of villages on the plains of northernChina, (1) a cluster of single-storey brick homes enclosed by walledcourtyards and surrounded by an expanse of flat, dry farmland. Re-
cently, however, efforts have been made to improve the built environment:
roads have been sealed, the walls that line the main street have been uni-
formly painted in pale yellow with dark red trim, neat rows of young trees
have been planted along the roadside, and a new “cultural square” has been
created in the centre of the village complete with stage, brightly coloured
exercise equipment, and an engraved marble monument that tells the his-
tory of the village on one side and on the other side lists the donors who fi-
nanced construction of the square. It turns out that Liuxian Village has done
quite well economically: two local factories (formerly village-owned enter-
prises) – one that produces rotary saw blades and another that manufac-
tures fireworks – have become large and successful private enterprises
employing around 600 of the village’s 1,800 residents. The other advantages
enjoyed by this village are its close proximity to a busy and rapidly growing
market town – providing outlets for its goods and additional business and
employment opportunities for its residents – and the fact that village land
borders the Beijing-Shenyang Freeway, thus offering good transport links to
major cities.
But Liuxian Village also has lots of shortcomings – at least this is the ver-
dict of the urban planners who were hired to draft a new plan for village re-
development through to 2020. According to their analysis, the main
problems are:
1. The village residential area is too big, resulting in a serious waste of
land;
2. The dispersed village layout is not conducive to the installation of public
infrastructure and facilities;
3. The functional zoning of village land is chaotic: aquaculture, industry,
housing, and public facilities are all mixed together;
4. The current land-use arrangements are not conducive to the future de-
velopment of any productive sectors;
5. The village has too many dead-end roads, and transport flow has been
neglected;
6. There is no effective landscaping in most parts of the village. (2)
The key to solving problems 1-4 is to implement a radical program of
land-use zoning, as the planners explain: “Through rearranging the current
industry and land resources, we will create four concentrated functional
zones: an aquaculture and fishing zone in the north; a processing and man-
ufacturing zone in the centre; a green agricultural zone in the south; and a
residential and public service zone in the east.” (3) The eastern zone, namely
the new Liuxian Village, retains some parts of the old village (renovated and
modernised) but also requires the demolition of a large section of the village
to make way for a new high-rise housing estate and to return land to other
productive purposes. According to the plan, where the old sprawling hori-
zontal village occupies around 30% of total village-controlled land, the new,
partially vertical village footprint will occupy only 10%, reducing the built-
up area of the village to one-third of its original size. The overall amount of
agricultural land will remain about the same as now, so the land reclaimed
through shrinking the village will mostly be used to expand non-agricultural
industries, with the principal objective of providing more local employment
opportunities for villagers as well as developing the local economy.
Problems 5 and 6 simply require some additional investment in roads and
landscaping. While better roads might promote economic development, the
imperative for landscaping seems a good deal less apparent. But the signif-
icance of landscaping is revealed when we consider the underlying logic of
village redevelopment. The planners of Liuxian Village claim that their
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1. This description is based on my visit to the village in November 2009. All the data and master
plan materials discussed below were collected then.
2. Liuxianzhuang, Liuxianzhuangcun xin minju guihua 2009-2020 (Liuxian Village new housing plan
2009-2020).
3. Ibid.
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broader objective is to promote “urban and rural integration” (cheng-xiang
yitihua 城乡一体化) and “the transformation of farmers into urbanites”
(nongmin shiminhua 农民市民化), and that this will be achieved through
“building a new countryside that is comfortable, harmonious, and
civilised.” (4) This redevelopment project, therefore, is not just about enhanc-
ing the economic efficiency and productivity of the village and lifting the
incomes of its residents. It is designed to be a coordinated and comprehen-
sive program for urbanising the village and transforming its residents. Land-
scaping seems critical to this “civilising” project because it is understood to
mark the difference between a rural and an urban built environment. Land-
scaping signifies the intervention of culture into the hitherto “natural” and
prosaic rural environment. Landscaping a settlement clearly demarcates the
boundary between social and cultural life on the one hand and agricultural
and industrial production on the other hand. Just as China’s cities have been
spatially restructured and landscaped in recent years to separate working
space from social and cultural space (witness the demise of the danwei and
the rise of the landscaped housing estate or xiaoqu), so rural China is be-
ginning to realise the same logic of “civilisation” through functional zoning
and soft landscaping.
At first glance the plan for Liuxian Village may seem unrealistic and ex-
travagant – even utopian. However, a quick survey of rural China will
demonstrate that this is not merely an isolated project dreamed up by am-
bitious local officials. Rather it is one of many thousands of such projects
that have emerged throughout rural China in recent years under the national
program to Build a New Socialist Countryside (jianshe shehui zhuyi xin
nongcun 建设社会主义新农村). (5) The push to modernise and reconstruct
rural China has been bolstered by the extension of urban planning into the
countryside: in 2007 the Urban Planning Law (chengshi guihua fa 城市规划
法), originally issued in 1990, was revised and reissued as the Urban and
Rural Planning Law (chengxiang guihua fa 城乡规划法) in 2007. (6) As a re-
sult, the principles and practices of urban planning began to be formally ap-
plied to rural as well as urban areas. The most far-reaching implication of
this change is that every administrative village in China is now required to
commission and implement a 20-year “master plan” for redevelopment.
The key features of the Liuxian Village plan – functional zoning, concen-
tration of resources, landscaping, high-rise living – underscore the extent
to which core principles of modernist urban planning are now being applied
to these rural redevelopment projects. But this trend should not be read as
a simple or straightforward transfer of planning techniques and practices
from one realm to another. In fact, a range of initiatives in rural planning
had been pioneered in various localities long before the new planning law
was issued. It would be more accurate to say, therefore, that the concepts
that underpin contemporary planning of village redevelopment have
emerged through the marriage of two quite separate governmental dis-
courses: a discourse of urban planning, with a genealogy that can be traced
back through PRC history to the Soviet Union and to the origins of mod-
ernist planning in Europe and America; (7) and a discourse focussed on prob-
lems of rural development in China, which can be traced back at least to
the Republican era, and which has generated considerable debate in recent
years under the rubric of “the three rural problems” (sannong wenti 三农问
题). (8)
In the first part of this paper, I show how these two discourses came to-
gether through key regional initiatives that sought to solve particular “rural
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4. Ibid.
5. Minzi Su, China’s Rural Development Policy: Exploring the “New Socialist Countryside,” Boulder,
First Forum Press, 2009.
6. State Council, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengxiang guihuafa (People’s Republic of China
Urban and Rural Planning Law), Beijing, 2007. The revised law was passed by the National People’s
Congress in late 2007, but only came into effect from the beginning of 2008.
7. For a genealogy of this discourse see David Bray, Social Space and Governance in Urban China:
The Danwei System from Origins to Reform, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005, pp. 66-93
and pp. 123-156.
8. See Stig Thøgersen, “Revisiting a Dramatic Triangle: The State, Villagers, and Social Activists in Chi-
nese Rural Reconstruction Projects,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2009, pp. 9-
33; and Lei Guang, “Bringing the City Back In: The Chinese Debate on Rural Problems,” in Martin
King Whyte, One Country, Two Societies: Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary China, Cam-
bridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 311-34.
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Photo 1 – Artist’s impression of Liuxian Village, circa 2020. 
Source: author’s photograph of public display board.
Photo 2 – New functional zoning scheme for Liuxian Village.
Source: author’s photograph of public display board.
problems” through the intervention of urban planning. The second part de-
scribes a case study based on fieldwork undertaken in rural Jiangsu, in order
to illustrate how this hybrid discourse of village re-building operates in prac-
tice and the impact of its implementation on the social and spatial structure
of a rural community. In the conclusion to this paper I situate my findings
within the wider literature as I agree with Ahlers and Schubert that the pro-
gram to Build a New Socialist Countryside is far more than just another po-
litical slogan. But, whereas they suggest that the focus on accelerated
urbanisation “mimics the historical experiences of Europe and industrialised
East Asia,” (9) I argue that both the discourses and the contemporary prac-
tices of rural spatial planning and urbanisation have unique and specific fea-
tures that cannot be understood through a European or East Asian
perspective. Indeed, my research shows that this program has initiated sig-
nificant redevelopment of rural built environments, and as a result has had
far-reaching impacts on the everyday lives of rural citizens. My objective is
not to make normative judgements on the “success” or otherwise of these
transformations, nor is it to offer advice on how to “improve” the program.
Rather, I seek to explain the background and logic of these initiatives and
to flag some of the social implications.
New foundations for rural planning: The
“three concentrations”
Jiangsu Province has played a major role in pioneering rural development
in recent years. Famous for its “Sunan (苏南) model” of collectively operated
rural enterprises, (10) Jiangsu was among the first provinces to develop strate-
gies for coordinating industry and agriculture in rural areas. With expanding
rural industry but limited rural land, and with concerns over food security
at both provincial and national levels, it is easy to understand how the need
for spatial planning of the countryside came to be seen as imperative. While
the 1986 Land Management Law required all of China’s jurisdictions to in-
crease oversight of land use, especially in relation to the preservation of
“primary farmland” (jiben nongtian 基本农田), Jiangsu went further with
the development of strategies designed to compensate for farmland lost to
industry by creating additional farmland. This was to be implemented by
reducing the spatial footprint of rural settlements. In provincial regulations
issued in 1994, local rural authorities were enjoined to:
Rationally arrange the layout of housing, village enterprises, public
infrastructure, and services; amalgamate dispersed natural villages
and progressively build modern villages that are more concentrated
and that possess a full complement of infrastructure; encourage rural
industry to concentrate into industry parks and provide land for fur-
ther development. (11)
By the mid-1990s, this strategy of “concentrating” rural settlements and
industry had been incorporated into a provincial master plan with specific
targets. It called for the province’s 289,000 “natural villages” (ziran cun 自
然村) to be consolidated into 20,330 “central villages” (zhongxin cun 中心
村) and 31,100 “basic villages” (jiben cun 基层村). If realised, this plan would
reduce the amount of rural land used for residential purposes by about 50%,
thereby releasing around three million mu (2,000 km2) of land for productive
uses. (12) But the plan was not just about saving farmland. It also introduced
rural land zoning to create buffers between agriculture and industry, entail-
ing a much higher degree of spatial planning. Henceforth, issues of eco-
nomic development, land use management, and rural settlement location
had to be considered together through coordinated planning, and through
a jurisdictional hierarchical system stretching from the province down
through cities, counties, towns, and rural townships. (13)
Jiangsu Province’s neighbour, Shanghai Municipality, also pioneered new
ways to coordinate planning across urban, semi-urban, and rural territories.
While Shanghai is best known over the last two decades for the redevelop-
ment and expansion of its core urban territory, including the spectacular
emergence of Pudong skyscrapers, Shanghai authorities have also invested
considerable efforts into the spatial restructuring of the municipality’s outer-
lying rural hinterlands. (14) Even more than Jiangsu, Shanghai faced the prob-
lem of how to reconcile rapidly developing rural industry with the
imperative to retain and protect primary farmland. In response to this co-
nundrum, Shanghai authorities followed Jiangsu’s lead in promoting the
consolidation of the rural population into larger, more compact settlements
and through the concentration of rural factories in industrial zones. But they
also went a step further than Jiangsu: encouraging farmers to amalgamate
their farmland (through various cooperative or shareholding mechanisms)
into larger farms in order to improve productivity. Around 1995, this suite
of rural restructuring policies gained official designation as the “three con-
centrations” (sange  jizhong 三个集中). (15)
In 2003, when the central government launched its new policy requiring
“coordinated planning of urban and rural development,” (16) Shanghai re-
sponded by revamping its existing program for rural restructuring and inte-
grated it with its larger municipal master plan. First it released a new guiding
document whose stated goals were now far more ambitious: namely, to
promote “urban and rural integration,” rural urbanisation, agricultural mod-
ernisation, and “the transformation of farmers into urbanites.” (17) To support
these ambitious goals and to accelerate sub-urban integration, the docu-
ment called for the rapid provision of essential infrastructure, facilities, and
services, including roads, transport, water, natural gas, electricity, commu-
nications, sewerage, garbage collection, health care, education, culture,
sports and entertainment, parks, shops, banks, and post offices. In short, the
“three concentrations” were now conceived as a strategy to bring urban
standards of living to the countryside. To achieve this, traditional villages
would be demolished and replaced by larger scale, fully serviced, residential
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9. Anna L. Ahlers and Gunter Schubert, “‘Building a New Socialist Countryside’ – Only a Political Slo-
gan?” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2009, pp. 35-62.
10. Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 2007, pp. 156-58.
11. Jiangsu Provincial People’s Congress, Jiangsusheng cunzhen guihua jianshe guanli tiaoli (Jiangsu
provincial regulations for the management of planning and construction in villages and towns),
Nanjing, 1994, Article 5.
12. Yi Zhang, “Liangquan jueze – ji Jiangsu cunzhen jianshe yu jiben nongtian ‘liangqu’ guiding” (Two
choices – record of Jiangsu village and town construction and the establishment of “two areas”
of primary farmland), Renmin ribao, 18 July 1997.
13. Guohui An, Erdong Zhang, and Yunmei An, Cunzhuang guihua yu guanli (Village planning and
management), Beijing, Zhongguo nongye chubanshe, 2009, p. 47.
14. T.G. McGee, G. Lin, A. Marton, M. Wang, and J. Wu, China’s Urban Space: Development Under Mar-
ket Socialism, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 121-41.
15. Yishao Shi and Bixia Yang, “Shanghai jiaoqu shishi ‘sange jizhong’ zhanlue de fansi ji duice jianyi”
(Reflections on and countermeasures against implementing the strategy of “three concentrations”
in suburban districts of Shanghai), Tongji daxue xuebao (shehui kexueban), Vol. 15, No. 6, 2004,
pp. 7-12.
16. One of “The Five Types of Coordinated Planning” (wuge tongchou 五个统筹) first enumerated in
the key document issued by the 3rd Plenum of the 16th Central Committee in October 2003.
17. Shanghai Municipal Government, “Guanyu qieshi tuijin ‘sange jizhong’ jiakuai shanghai jiaoqu
fazhande guihua gangyao” (Plan for implementing “the three concentrations” to accelerate de-
velopment in Shanghai suburbs), Shanghai, 2004.
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settlements. This approach was subsequently endorsed by central govern-
ment authorities. In a key national document on design standards for rural
reconstruction, issued in 2006, implementation of the “three concentra-
tions” is recommended for all areas with “comparatively dense” rural pop-
ulations. (18)
In 2006, Shanghai authorities unveiled a new-look master plan to guide
future development. Known as the “1-9-6-6 Urban System,” it conceptu-
alises Shanghai’s entire administrative territory as a coordinated spatial sys-
tem with four tiers of settlement comprising one central city
(zhongxincheng 中心城), nine “new cities” (xincheng 新城), 60 “new market
towns” (xinshizhen 新市镇) and 600 “central villages” (zhongxincun 中新
村). (19) At the time it was released, the Municipality of Shanghai still had
109 towns (zhen) and 1,862 administrative villages under its jurisdiction. (20)
Shanghai‘s “1-9-6-6” plan was particularly significant because of the way
it combined a hitherto diverse collection of planning and development poli-
cies into a single coordinated scheme, which amounted to a gradated urban
system that extended across the entire continuum of urban and rural terri-
tory. In sum, not only did Shanghai authorities revamp rural planning
through the “three concentrations” initiative, but they also linked this to a
small town urbanisation strategy and incorporated both into master plan-
ning for the entire metropolis. In this respect, the “1-9-6-6” plan established
the conceptual framework of “urban and rural integration” (21) on which the
new national planning law was to be based.
Zhejiang pioneers “village planning”
In mid-2003, authorities in Zhejiang launched a pilot rural redevelopment
program known as “One Thousand Model Villages, Ten Thousand Renovated
Villages” (qiancun shifan, wancun zhengzhi 千村示范，万村整治). The broad
objectives of this program were to upgrade village public services and in-
frastructure and to remediate the problem, as they phrased it, of rural en-
vironments being “dirty, chaotic, and backward” (zang, luan, cha 脏 , 乱 , 
差). (22) To provide a specific direction for implementing this program, the
Provincial Bureau of Construction issued a document entitled (Trial) Guide-
lines for Drafting Village Plans. (23) It was the first time in China that a “village
plan” (cunzhuang guihua 村庄规划) was officially recognised as a distinct
branch of spatial planning in its own right.
According to Zhejiang provincial authorities, in the first five years of the
program, 1,181 villages were transformed into “all-round moderately afflu-
ent model villages” (quanmian xiaokang jianshe shifan cun 全面小康建设
示范村) while another 10,303 villages underwent “environmental rehabili-
tation” (huanjing zhengzhi 环境整治). (24) In total, around one in three ad-
ministrative villages in Zhejiang participated in the program, although only
one tenth benefited from the full redevelopment package. (25) Despite this
limited coverage, Zhejiang’s rural initiative was ground-breaking. Not only
did it anticipate the national program to Build a New Socialist Countryside
by over two years, it also pioneered technical standards and practices for
renovating and reconstructing village settlements. Within a year, other
provinces picked up the experiments in Zhejiang: Jiangsu and Jiangxi in
2004, Beijing and Liaoning in 2005. (26) In August 2005, the Ministry of Con-
struction sent a high-level delegation, led by its Minister, to study the pro-
gram in Jiangxi. Following its favourable report to the State Council, village
redevelopment was included as a key component when the national pro-
gram to Build a New Socialist Countryside was announced in October
2005. (27)
Just as conceptual innovations such as the “three concentrations” first ap-
peared within provincial jurisdictions (Jiangsu and Shanghai), so moves to
initiate systematic spatial planning at the village level emerged from ex-
perimental trials undertaken in a few provincial locations. Prior to this, the
village was seen as simply a minor subset of town (zhen 镇) planning. But
with the emergence of new urbanisation policies focused on “small cities
and towns,” the town came to be understood as an urban rather than rural
domain, and regional authorities recognised the need to develop a separate
conception of the village as a distinct form of built environment. 
In 2008, the concept of the “village plan” was given definitive legal status
under the new Urban and Rural Planning Law. Previously covered by a range
of piecemeal national and local regulations, spatial planning for villages as
well as towns and townships has now been brought into the mainstream of
national spatial planning law. (28) This makes them subject to two kinds of co-
ordinated planning: first, each is required to produce a long-term master plan
setting out land use, functional zoning, infrastructure provision, transport de-
velopment, and environmental protection within its territory for the following
20 years; and second, each becomes subject to “strategic” regional plans (quyu
guihua 区域规划) developed at higher government levels. For example, each
province is required to draft a strategic “urban system plan” (chengzhen tixi
guihua 城镇体系规划) that sets out the relationships between all cities,
county towns, towns, and rural townships. (29) Similarly, at the town level, each
jurisdiction has to devise a strategic “town and village location plan” (zhencun
buju guihua 镇村布局规划, also referred to as zhenyu guihua 镇域规划) (30)
that establishes the future number, location, and relationships between the
various administrative and “natural” villages within this territory. (31)The strate-
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gic plans provide broader levels of regional and national coordination, because
they link each territorial jurisdiction to its neighbouring jurisdictions and to
the wider development strategies of superior jurisdictions. When a town be-
gins to draft its own master plan, for example, it must ensure that its devel-
opment plans conform to the strategic plan already established by the county
and city governments to which it is subordinate.
In the preceding section I have shown how concepts from urban planning
have been increasingly employed to address problems of rural development
in key provincial jurisdictions over the last two decades. In Jiangsu the ex-
pansion of rural industry led to concerns over the preservation of farmland
and hence the decision to adapt “rational” urban planning principles to the
organisation of rural land usage. As a result, authorities began to enforce
spatial zoning to separate farmland from industrial and residential areas.
Municipal leaders in Shanghai expanded on these initiatives to integrate its
rural hinterland into a coordinated spatial hierarchy that extended the prin-
ciples of urban planning across the entire municipality. In Zhejiang, the co-
ordinated planning of rural space was further enhanced through the
development of specific technical standards for the renovation, re-design,
and re-construction of village settlements. Here the intervention was justi-
fied as a response to a decaying rural environment characterised as “dirty,
chaotic, and backward.” 
It has been through these provincial initiatives that the discourses of urban
planning and the discourses of rural rejuvenation have inexorably come to-
gether, culminating in the incorporation of rural territory into the formal
government regime of spatial planning. Thus, for the first time, rural settle-
ments have come under the same legal planning framework as cities. (32)
The objective with this initiative is not only to use urban planning as a
mechanism for controlling rampant over-development and for preserving
farmland, but also for promoting modernisation of the built environment
in those parts of rural China that remain under-developed. The application
of urban planning concepts, expertise, and processes to rural China has be-
come a significant component within the larger program to Build a New
Socialist Countryside, and has clearly led to the emergence of a new mode
and new phase of urbanisation. In the following section of this paper I ex-
plore some of the parameters of rural urbanisation through a case study of
village redevelopment.
The Qinglong master plan (33)
Qinglong is an administrative village in Jiangsu Province located 22 km
southeast of Nanjing’s city centre. In 2006, when its new master plan was
first drafted, it had around 1,080 households and a total population of just
over 3,200 people spread over 14 separate natural villages ranging in size
from 16 to 145 households. The village controls a territory of 10 km2, in-
cluding fertile river flats used for grain and vegetable production, areas of
low hills covered in tea plantations, and a more rugged hilly area to the
north, which is mostly forested but also has some small quarries.
Historically Qinglong has always been under the jurisdiction of Chunhua
Town, (34) which was itself subordinate to Jiangning County. In 2000, the
county was converted to a district under Nanjing City; then in 2004, the
official designations of the subordinate administrative jurisdictions were
also “urbanised,” such that Chunhua Town (zhen) became Chunhua Subdis-
trict Office (jiedao banshichu 街道办事处) and Qinglong’s designation was
changed from “village” (cun 村) to “neighbourhood community” (shequ 社
区 ). Since the early 1990s, the term “community” had gradually been
adopted to designate the basic administrative unit within urban areas, for-
merly known as the Residents’ Committee (jumin weiyuen hui居民委员会),
but had never been used in reference to rural settlements. (35) While Qinglong
is relatively close to Nanjing City, and parts of Jiangning have merged into
Nanjing’s urban sprawl, Qinglong itself remains largely rural, with the vast
majority of its land still under agricultural production. The decision by Nan-
jing authorities to apply urban jurisdictional terminology to almost all its
subordinate territories, including those that remain largely rural, seems to
have been one response to the central government directive calling for the
integration of urban and rural areas. (36) But when we examine the Qinglong
master plan, we will see that this change in nomenclature was not simply
a superficial semantic shift. Rather, it signalled the beginning of a whole
range of substantive redevelopment initiatives designed to provide the res-
idents of Qinglong with services, infrastructure, and a built environment
that resembled those available to Nanjing’s urban residents. Indeed, the
2006 edition of the Jiangsu Provincial Guidelines for Village Planning and
Construction states that one of the key objectives of village redevelopment
is to “promote the extension of urban civilisation into the countryside.” (37)
In 2006, Qinglong was chosen by the Jiangning District Government to
be one of four district-level “high-standard trial sites” (gao biaozhun shifan
dian 高标准示范点) for Building a New Socialist Countryside. (38) The District
Construction Bureau then commissioned planners from the Jiangsu Acad-
emy of Planning and Design to draft master plans for each of the four trial
village sites. Qinglong’s plan was approved (39) for implementation in October
2006. (40) The plan is formally entitled Qinglong Community New Country-
side Construction Plan, and is divided into three sections respectively titled:
“Master Plan,” “Donglong Central Village Short-term Renovation Plan,” and
“Donglong Central Village Long-term Renovation Plan.” The first section cov-
ers land-use and economic development for the entire territory, while the
second and third sections outline a two-part program for the renovation
and redevelopment of Qinglong’s largest natural village, Donglong, which
had long been host to the administrative and Party headquarters for Qing-
long. The new master plan seeks to build on this existing role and enhance
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Donglong’s status as Qinglong’s primary settlement and the site for key
public services and administration. For these reasons, its planning and de-
velopment have been prioritised over other villages.
But the most significant feature of Qinglong’s master plan is the stipula-
tion that its original 14 natural villages will be “concentrated” into three
settlements based on the largest three existing villages – Donglong (东龙),
Xilong (西龙), and Du Cun (杜村) – meaning that 11 smaller villages and
hamlets will be demolished and the residents relocated into new housing
developments within the larger settlements. (41) One of the key objectives
for “concentrating” settlements, of course, is to save land. According to the
Qinglong master plan, the total land used for residential settlements will
be reduced from 150 hectares to 63 hectares, saving 87 hectares for other
uses. (42) 52 hectares of this land were designated for development of a new
industrial park located to the north of Donglong Village. Another 30 hectares
were set aside for expanding the existing small public cemetery. In addition,
an area of around 140 hectares of tea plantations adjacent to a large water
reservoir in the north-east part of Qinglong was designated for tourism de-
velopment – including facilities for fishing, sightseeing, and accommoda-
tion. (43)
Originally approved for implementation in 2006, the Qinglong master plan
has subsequently undergone a major round of revision. In the revised ver-
sion, which appeared in 2010, the industrial zone was expanded to almost
double its original size, while the Donglong Village site was extended by an
additional 50%. Qinglong officials had to apply to the District government
for permission to expand these zones because the changes necessarily en-
croached on existing farmland.
Renovating Qinglong’s environment
Although the master plan was not formally ratified until October 2006,
major efforts to clean up and modernise Qinglong’s built environment began
in April as soon as it was designated a “high standard trial site.” Following
provincial guidelines, the Qinglong leadership began tackling key problems
associated with village sanitation, pollution, and basic infrastructure. Known
as the “six clean-ups and six set-ups” (liuqing liujian六清六建), this initiative
required participating villages to implement six specific projects:
1. Clean up rubbish; set up a rubbish management system;
2. Clean up manure; set up a human and animal waste management sys-
tem;
3. Clean up straw; set up a comprehensive system for re-using all straw;
4. Clean up waterways; set up a water management system;
5. Clean up industrial pollution; set up a stable and standards-based system;
6. Clean up chaotic construction practices; set up a system for managing
village appearance. (44)
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Photo 3 – Qinglong land-use circa 2006; 
existing villages are shaded in light color. 
Source: author’s photograph of local planning document.
Photo 4 – Projected land-use plan for Qinglong 2020, revised
version 2008; proposed residential areas shaded in light color,
proposed industry park shaded in slightly dark grey.
Source: author’s photograph of local planning document.
By the middle of 2007, Qinglong’s leaders were able to report that all six
projects had been implemented fully in the three central villages and par-
tially in the other villages, and that as a result, the former “dirty, chaotic,
and backward” local environment had been given a “new look.” According
to their report, they had built 60 new large rubbish bins and employed 16
sanitation staff; they had connected every household to piped water, in-
stalled flush toilets in each home, established systems for treating sewerage,
and had ensured that all open manure pits had been converted into closed
composting systems; they had forbidden the burning of straw and organised
ways to re-use it in the vegetable fields and tea plantations, and had cleaned
and dredged 15 ponds, 3.8 km of waterways, and 1.5 km of floodways – ap-
proximately one third of the total. Finally, they had improved the village en-
vironment by converting 17.5 km of village roads from dirt to cement, by
the demolition of 11 cow sheds, 145 pig pens, and a range of other so-called
“dilapidated or illegal constructions,” and by planting around 10,000 trees
and 5,000 m2 of grass. (45)
Although not directly specified as part of the “six clean-ups,” Qinglong
authorities decided to eliminate domestic pig-breeding from every village
under their jurisdiction. They achieved this by classifying household pigsties,
traditionally located in courtyards adjacent to homes, as “dilapidated or il-
legal constructions,” thereby justifying their demolition as part of the pro-
gram to improve the village’s appearance. To forestall opposition, Qinglong’s
leadership agreed to pay each affected household an annual compensation
of 300 yuan per person for “meat expenses.” (46)
While the provincial guidelines were silent on the issue of pig breeding,
justification for this intervention can be found in central government doc-
uments. In their instructions on village renovation, the Ministry of Construc-
tion calls for the “separation of humans and domestic animals” (ren chu
fenli 人畜分离) (47) on the grounds that keeping animals in residential areas
increases the potential for outbreaks of contagious disease and leads to
many disputes between neighbours. (48) Such problems can be avoided
through implementing a “strict separation of residential zones and produc-
tion zones, so as to establish concentrated residential areas and concen-
trated livestock and poultry breeding areas.” (49) In this pronouncement we
find again the emphasis on functional zoning as a key strategy for re-or-
dering the rural environment. In this case it not only serves to improve vil-
lage appearance through removing the unsightly pigsties, but also fosters a
shift to a larger-scale mode of production that is seen by authorities as more
efficient, hygienic, and scientific.
Creating a new civic centre
With the launch of the master plan in late 2006, Qinglong moved from
an environmental clean-up phase into a new construction phase. Key proj-
ects in this phase included development of the new industrial park and the
enhancement of public facilities and services in Donglong. In the past, Qin-
glong residents had to travel to Chunhua or to Jiangning for anything more
than rudimentary medical treatment or to access most of the welfare ben-
efits or government services. Now they enjoy a full range of community
services and welfare facilities much closer to home. These include a newly-
built community health clinic, a cultural centre, and a community public
service counter where local residents can access most welfare and govern-
ment services with no need to travel farther afield. This service counter is
also the site through which new national initiatives such as the rural coop-
erative health insurance system and the rural minimum living allowance are
administered.
The expansion of village facilities and services is reflected in the physical
growth of the village’s civic centre. The urban planners have sought to
arrange the new facilities into a systematic and logical spatial order based
on the underlying principle of functional zoning. Thus, in the second part of
the Qinglong master plan, the “Donglong Central Village Short-term Reno-
vation Plan,” the planners explain that they have divided Donglong into
three zones: the old village zone, the new village zone, and the public service
zone; and that one of the key objectives is to redevelop the current village
centre into a “lively and fully-functional public service zone.” (50)
At the centre of this zone is a 1,200 m2 public “cultural” square. Equipped
with a stage at one end, the square can be used for cultural performances
and for large-scale village meetings. However, the designers also intend for
the space to be used more informally for everyday leisure activities. To this
end, around the perimeter of the paved area they have provided shady trees,
landscaping, seating, and exercise equipment.
Qinglong’s square also serves as a spatial focal point around which a range
of other facilities and services are located. Indeed, because of its centrality,
the square has been designated as the main location for disseminating in-
formation to the public. Along its southern edge, between the square and
the footpath that leads from the old village zone towards the cultural centre,
the health clinic, and the new village residential area, a long row of glass-
covered notice boards have been erected. A wide range of information is
provided here, including public health notices, guides to resident services,
recent newspapers, reports on community meetings and finances, notices
on upcoming cultural events, and educational materials related to wider
policies such as family planning. To further underscore its spatial significance
as the heart of village life, authorities have installed a large sculpture of a
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Photo 5 – Dragon Square, Donglong Village 2009. 
Source: author’s photograph.
rampant dragon right in the middle of the square. Literally embodying the
name of the community – Qinglong, or “green dragon” – this sculpture is
apparently intended to symbolise the new spirit of vitality and strength that
underpins Qinglong’s recent redevelopment and future ambitions.
The other key public facilities are arranged in close proximity to Dragon
Square. The cultural centre abuts directly onto the eastern edge of the
square, while the community’s administrative headquarters, which houses
the public service counter, is located opposite the square, on the other side
of the main road. The new health clinic and kindergarten are sited just to
the east of the cultural centre, on the southern edge of the new village res-
idential zone. A public bathhouse, built some years previously, sits just be-
yond the northern edge of the square, while across the village road – which
forms the western boundary of the square – can be found Qinglong’s small
commercial strip, including two general stores, two simple restaurants, and
a hardware store. Although modest by urban standards, the development
of these public facilities significantly improves both the number and quality
of services available.
New “village” residential development
The next stage in implementing the master plan was to commence the
program to “concentrate” the original 14 villages into three “central villages.”
The first to be moved was a small hamlet called Wei Cun, whose 35 house-
holds were relocated to a new residential estate (xiaoqu 小区) on a piece
of land immediately to the east of Donglong’s civic centre. Building work
commenced in 2008, and according to local officials, the entire project cost
around 19 million yuan. Grants from the City and the District contributed
1.3 million, but the rest was paid over three years by Qinglong Community
itself from their collective income of around 15 million yuan per year. In
order to encourage the residents of Wei Cun to move, the Community of-
fered houses in the new xiaoqu on the basis of a one-for-one exchange of
house area. (51) For example, if their house in the old village was 100 square
metres, then the family received 100 square metres of new housing for free.
If any families wished to have a larger house in the new development, they
could purchase extra space for 1,000 yuan per square metre, which was 300
yuan below the actual construction cost. Costs covered by the Community
included all the infrastructure, landscaping, and on-going maintenance of
the estate. Services such as gas, electricity, and water are also subsidised in
order to keep costs down for the new residents. In moving into the new xi-
aoqu, villagers did lose most of their former “private plot” land, (52) but they
retain all their agricultural land and their share in the Community’s collective
income. Many villagers also earn income through work in local agriculture
or industry.
According to Qinglong’s Deputy Party Chief, Wei Cun villagers were con-
sulted in every phase of the planning and development process. 
We got every household to select a representative and explained the
project to them in detail, then hired a couple of buses to take them
to visit some comparatively good rural xiaoqu in other parts of Jiangn-
ing where they could talk to the locals about their own experiences
in relocation. Afterwards at lunchtime we asked them what they
thought. They all said, “Great, we support your plan, let’s do it”...Then
after we came back we started to design this xiaoqu. It’s a rural resi-
dential area, it’s not for city people. Rural people all need a bit more
space; it’s what they are used to. During construction, especially when
the foundations were being laid, there were always at least three vil-
lagers on site to inspect and supervise the work. At that stage they
didn’t know which house would be whose, but they wanted to make
sure that all the construction work was done properly.
The strategy of keeping the village together as a social unit has met with
appreciation, as one of the villagers commented in 2011:
Yes, it’s the same as before, nothing has changed. It’s not like in the
city where neighbours don’t know each other. Here we all know each
other. We’re all still the same people living in close proximity and
seeing each other all the time. My mother said to me that she would
much rather stay where she knows people and can chat and meet
up with friends.
Although the new xiaoqu is directly adjacent to the village of Donglong,
the planners have sought to maintain a degree of distinctive identity. First,
just like an urban xiaoqu, this residential area is enclosed and gated, with a
two-meter high fence clearly separating it from the rest of Donglong. Sec-
ondly, it has been officially named Longwei xiaoqu (龙魏小区) –combining
the “long” from Qinglong and Donglong with the “wei” from Wei Cun – thus
symbolising continuity of the old village even as it is appended to a larger
settlement. Thirdly, the governance structure of the old Wei Cun hamlet –
the villagers’ small group (cunmin xiaozu 村民小组) – has been maintained
in the new location. (53)
Yet at the same time, it is difficult to reconcile continuity with the radical
disjuncture in the built environment. Where the old village was an organic
sprawl of vernacular buildings from different periods, consisting of houses,
sheds, and yards set among fish ponds, vegetable gardens, and orchards, the
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Photo 6 – Artist's impression bird’s-eye-view of Longwei
xiaoqu, 2008. Source: author’s photograph of public display board.
new “village” looks like a little piece of contemporary middle-class suburbia.
The neat rows of two-storey, gable-roofed villas set in landscaped gardens
and manicured lawns would not be out of place in the suburbs of any mod-
ern Western city. However, the neat vision of contemporary middle-class
suburbia is somewhat undermined by the realisation that there is no private
land within this residential development. There are no enclosed yards and
no internal fences of any sort. The homes sit directly in the midst of the
landscaped parkland.
The absence of private yards not only runs counter to our understanding
of suburbia, it also breaks with long-standing practice in rural China. Tradi-
tionally in many parts of China, the archetypal home was sited within a
courtyard, or yuanzi (院子). (54) Ideally the yuanzi is fully enclosed, its en-
trance marked by an ornamental gate, but in practice, the yuanzi can still
be functionally present even without physical enclosure. Often it is simply
a cluster of structures – houses, sheds, out-buildings – where the family’s
possessions are stored and arranged. In old Wei Cun, like the other villages
of Qinglong, some yards were enclosed and some were not; nevertheless,
all of them had a yuanzi of some kind. Functionally, the yuanzi facilitates
certain types of familial social interactions. Many yuanzi contain more than
one conjugal family unit – often the parents and one or more of their mar-
ried children (usually but not always sons) will have separate homes within
the yuanzi. In this situation, the yuanzi provides a spatial structure to me-
diate and order the relationships between branches of an extended family
unit. The new xiaoqu is not designed to accommodate these kinds of rela-
tionships, because each household is distinctly demarcated from every other
within an open, transparent and geometrically ordered public space. The
yuanzi tends to blur the distinction between inside and outside, as residents
move between buildings within the yuanzi for cooking and eating, carrying
out chores, feeding domestic animals, and socialising with other family
members. In contrast, the xiaoqu is inscribed with a rigid binary spatial code
based on a transparent differentiation between inside and outside. Inside
the home is private, (55) but as soon as residents walk outside the door they
have entered the open public domain. While the xiaoqu itself is an enclosed
compound, its enclosure operates at the scale of the “village” rather than
the family unit. This is “collective” or “community” space, landscaped and
regulated under the management of Qinglong authorities. Unlike in the old
village, there is no in-between space, simply a numbered front door that
marks the boundary between inside and outside and recodes it as a thresh-
old between private and public.
The loss of the yuanzi is part of a spatial reconfiguration that results both
from the imperative to save land and from the desire to modernise rural
life. The old Wei Cun occupied 110 mu of land, while the new residential
area only takes up about 40 mu. Land has been “saved” through eliminating
the yuanzi as well as the vegetable plots, fish ponds, orchards, and animal
enclosures. One of the villagers explained these changes in the following
way in 2011:
In the old village there is more space and no walls, so you need dogs
to protect your place; you also have plenty of space to breed ducks
and chickens. But in this enclosed xiaoqu you don’t need to worry
about safety so you don’t need dogs; and there is not enough space
now for poultry.
Actually, there is a great deal of open space within the xiaoqu, certainly
more than enough to provide areas for poultry raising. What he seems to
mean is that there is no appropriate space for poultry, nowhere that they
belong in the new spatial regime that underpins this urban-style xiaoqu. For
if the homes don’t have yards, then where could the poultry live?
The modernity of the new “village” is not only embodied in its architec-
tural and spatial forms, and in the exclusion of productive animals, but also
through the provision of a full complement of contemporary technologies
that previously have been found only in urban residential areas: hot and
cold running water, sewerage, cooking gas, and digital broadband cable. Old
Wei Cun was not connected to sewers, gas, or communications. The con-
nection of each household to running water through the advent of domestic
plumbing replaces communal water supply and public bathing with priva-
tised modes of personal hygienic practice. Meanwhile, the new digital broad-
band cable connects the residents of Longwei xiaoqu to a vast world of
information and entertainment. Of course, villagers formerly had some ac-
cess to these networks through broadcast television and mobile tele-
phones, (56) but the broadband cable increases the volume and ease of access
by many magnitudes: villagers now can watch more than 100 TV channels
and view many thousands of internet sites.
For the new residents of Longwei xiaoqu, the implications are both struc-
turing and enabling: the technologies that underpin the form and the func-
tioning of the new “village” circumscribe their everyday lives in significant
new ways. At the same time, their connection to these technological net-
works opens up new possibilities for engagement with, and mobility across,
other parts of the network. 
However, not every resident of the old Wei Cun is attracted to the appar-
ent benefits of the new xiaoqu and the technologies it embodies. Mr. and
Mrs. Guo don’t want to move. Although they have been given two units in
the new xiaoqu (their son and daughter-in-law have already moved into
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Photo 7 – Longwei xiaoqu, 2011.
Source: author’s photograph.
one unit) they prefer to stay in their old home of four decades. Even as all
the neighbouring homes are demolished around them, they are determined
to hold out as long as possible. At first it seemed their main concern was
what they believe to be inadequate financial compensation for the fruit
trees, fish ponds, and vegetable gardens they have to give up as part of the
move. (57) But in my most recent meeting with them it became clear that
they have more fundamental objections, as Mr. Guo explained:
There’s nothing for us to do in that place. You’re not allowed to grow
vegetables or raise chickens and ducks there. We’re old farmers, not
city people or workers… And why should we pay for water and cook-
ing gas when we get those things for free here? We have a well full
of fresh mountain spring water and plenty of wood, straw, and chaff
for cooking. You even have to pay for the water to flush your shit
away over there! (58)
Former neighbours who have already moved into the new xiaoqu are far
from sympathetic, suggesting that the Guos are simply greedy and are hold-
ing out for more compensation. However, it seems clear that beyond the
issues of compensation and the fear of higher costs of living, the Guos are
just not attracted to the way of life on offer in the new xiaoqu. Apparently,
the lure of modern plumbing, cable TV, cooking gas, and landscaped gardens
cannot overcome their deeply entrenched attachment to a familiar if sim-
pler way of life. Ultimately, the apparently utopian aim to integrate urban
and rural China relies upon the ability to persuade villagers to give up land
and to transform their way of life. While many are no doubt happy to make
this shift to an urban-style life, others will resist until dislodged by coercive
force.
Conclusions
My objectives in this paper have been twofold: first I sought to reconstruct
the key moves that resulted in urban planning taking a rural turn in China;
and secondly I endeavoured to illustrate the momentous implications of
this turn through describing the implementation of an actual village “master
plan.” My interest in the program to Build a New Socialist Countryside, or
in rural redevelopment in general, does not lie in the field of political econ-
omy. No doubt some readers will feel that I have neglected many details
concerning the state/society relations, the political connections, and the
funding arrangements associated with this village redevelopment project.
However, if I have neglected these questions, it is because I wanted to de-
vote more attention to understanding the actual physical transformations
to the village built environment. Thus, my question was not “How did village
officials raise the money to build all this stuff?” Rather, it was “What did
they build, what were they trying to achieve and how did the transformed
built environment impact village life?” 
As well as asking some different questions, my research suggests some
different conclusions. For example, in their otherwise illuminating study of
rural development in Shaanxi and Zhejiang, Ahlers and Schubert reach two
conclusions that do not gel with my findings. First, in characterising the pro-
gram to Build a New Socialist Countryside as a “macro-policy,” they argue
that it provides only “rough guidelines for implementation while delegating
the main work of policy concretization to local governments.” (59) My study
on the redevelopment of rural built environments, however, demonstrates
that this part of the program has been driven by a highly centralised spatial
planning regime, which mandates very detailed standards and specifications
for design and construction. Secondly, their argument that China’s current
emphasis on rural urbanisation simply mimics a development model from
Europe and industrialised East Asia ignores the specific genealogical
processes through which Chinese discourses of urban planning merged with
discourses of rural rejuvenation, as described in this paper, to create a unique
strategy for rural urbanisation. Illustrated through a case study of the Qin-
glong master plan, I have shown that while this form of spatial planning en-
forces a modernist, urban-style vision of the built environment, it is also
underpinned by an ethos of continuity, which seeks to hold rural commu-
nities together even as their everyday lives are re-inscribed through radical
socio-technical interventions. 
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